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Human relationships with cars are multifaceted and morally fraught. Cars serve multiple 
functions, and generate experiences characteristic of both fine art and everyday 
aesthetic experience – but they’re also the roots of dire eco-social ills. Recent theories 
tend to undermine the aesthetic aspects of human-automobile relationships in order to 
emphasize cars’ ethically problematic effects. But cars’ shameful consequences need 
not cancel out their beauty or their relevance to aesthetic theories. I suggest that David 
Hume’s aesthetic tenets demonstrate how and why cars are beautiful, foregrounding 
considerations that automobile aesthetics can’t afford to ignore but that risk being 
obscured by cars’ positively and negatively charged status. For instance, Hume 
underscores rational choice as an element of aesthetic experience: we can choose how 
and when to experience cars’ beauty or ugliness. According to Hume, utility tends to 
inspire sentiments of beauty; and what is ethically good is most useful to humanity at 
large. But tension arises from this principle, as Hume finds that even socially harmful 
phenomena are yet aesthetically interesting. This provocative tension is at the heart of 
the aesthetic appreciation of cars, and is part of what makes such appreciation 
worthwhile. Hume paves the way to a realistic aesthetics of automobiles that can 
account for their problematic effects while refusing to downplay their aesthetic potential. 
 
____   
Introduction. 
A TV commercial for the 2011 Chrysler 300 lists a few qualities that contribute to 
the greatness of a great car. First, character and conviction: charming aesthetic 
attributes. Then luxury, speed, fuel efficiency. These are utilitarian features. But they 
come with consequences that make some ecologists, social critics, and aestheticians 
uncomfortable. In general, human relationships with cars are multifaceted and morally 
fraught. Recent theories consequently tend to undermine the aesthetic aspects of 
human-automobile relationships, in order to emphasize cars’ ethically problematic 
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effects. However, David Hume’s aesthetics may provide a framework whence we might 
acknowledge the cohabitation of beauty and shame in our experiences with cars, 
pointing the way towards a realistic aesthetics of automobiles. 
Cars exemplify the principles of fine-art aesthetics and everyday aesthetics, but 
repulse several aestheticians who work in both arenas. For example, Noël Carroll 
explicitly excludes cars from the realm of art, even though his definition of “art” fully 
accommodates cars. In his conception, something is an artwork if one can find a 
narrative explanation that “links the contested work to preceding art, and artmaking 
practices and contexts, in such a way that the work under fire can be seen to be the 
intelligible outcome of recognizable modes of thinking and making already of a sort 
commonly adjudged to be artistic.”1 Since historians acknowledge that automobile 
design has roots in Art Deco and Art Nouveau,2 and since cars are regularly exhibited 
by fine-art museums: by Carroll’s definition, cars are works of art. However, Carroll 
insists that his definition of art excludes automobiles. He does not say why, only 
contends that those who do believe “a Cadillac convertible would be a work of art” must 
be operating with false definitions of art.3  
Cars also generate the aesthetic experiences that Yuriko Saito and Sherri Irvin 
identify as integral to everyday experience. If, as for Saito, an aesthetic reaction is “any 
reaction we form toward the sensuous and/or design qualities of any object, 
phenomenon, or activity”; then enjoying the way a new Jeep bucks at the slightest touch 
of the gas, or sensing cheery steadfastness in the boxy lines of an old CR-V, constitutes 
aesthetic experience.4 By Irvin’s definition, in which an everyday aesthetic experience 
“involves my imparting a certain shape or texture to a small part of my life, over and 
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above any other goal I might be aiming to fulfill,” the small pleasures one might take in 
careening through the fast lane, or in a carwash well done, are valuable aesthetic 
experiences.5 Yet, cars receive no mention in Saito’s otherwise comprehensive study; 
and for Irvin, as I’ll discuss later, cars are incompatible with the aesthetic. Like Carroll, 
neither Saito nor Irvin offers reasons for excluding cars from aesthetic experience. All 
three authors take it for granted that cars cannot be aesthetically valuable.  
It is more than likely that existing notions neither of “art” nor of “aesthetic 
experience” can entirely do justice to our aesthetic relationships with cars. But that 
question is for another day, and a comprehensive theory of automotive experience. 
Here I’d venture to suggest that it’s probably on ethical grounds that these aestheticians 
I have quoted are loath to value or even mention cars. People tend love cars for their 
unique appeal to all the senses, their associations with freedom, glamour, and 
ingenuity; nonetheless the car as such, along with its very concept and mode of being, 
is also associated with global warming and other dire risks to the environment, with 
untimely death and pretentious excess. Perhaps the theorists I have mentioned cannot 
dissociate these concerns from cars’ aesthetic potential.  
Likewise, for Hume: beauty, morality, and utility are irrevocably intertwined. Yet, 
from a Humean perspective, cars’ potentially unethical effects need not cancel out their 
beauty or their relevance to aesthetic theories. Hume’s aesthetic tenets demonstrate 
how and why cars are beautiful, foregrounding considerations that automobile 
aesthetics can’t afford to ignore but that risk being obscured by cars’ positively and 
negatively charged status. In turn, considering cars from a Humean standpoint 
encourages provocative perspectives on Hume’s ideas. 
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Let me make clear: my purpose in theorizing automobile aesthetics is not to 
argue that cars should be championed or banned. I am not here to say that SUVs and 
supercars are bad while hybrids are good, or to argue the opposite point. Just to give 
you an idea of where I stand as a car owner, my pride and joy is a 2001 Honda CR-V, 
the non-limited edition with the 4-cylinder engine, which gets up to 23 mpg on the 
highway. This wagon is middle-of-the-road in terms of size, price, and popularity. It’s 
also the vehicle that made me love and start to think deeply about the automotive in 
general. To return to business: my purpose today is merely to begin to theorize how 
humans relate to automobiles. Already we can see that this relationship is complex, rife 
with tension, and in some aspects – for better or worse – aesthetic.   
 
Humean Point 1. Sentiments of beauty are contextually independent and 
deliberately shaped. 
In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and Treatise of Human 
Nature, Hume evaluates the beauty of poetry and drama alongside that of machines, 
houses, and moral acts, according to the same standards. Beauty and ugliness are 
pleasurable and painful “sentiments” that may be triggered by a variety of phenomena, 
but that we nonetheless experience for the same reasons in every case.6 “The same 
endowments,” in Hume’s words, bring about the sentiment of beauty “in every 
circumstance.”7 Hence the visible qualities that make a painting beautiful may also 
make a car beautiful. This view may be read as a contrast to that of Saito, who writes 
that:  
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the aesthetic dimension of our life which is deeply embedded in our 
everyday affairs, while it can be influenced by art, operates quite 
independently from our experience of art...Art, whatever its designation, 
no matter how inclusive that notion becomes, and even when its intent is 
to blur the distinction from life, is necessarily characterized as an 
exception to or commentary on everyday objects and affairs.8    
Hume’s view is more convincing, in my opinion: it is highly plausible that our standards 
and impressions of beauty operate in the same way regardless of context.  
As at once art objects, tools, and “vehicles” of aesthetic experience, cars 
exemplify Hume’s point. Collector Ralph Lauren implies that part of what makes a car 
“exciting” to drive are the “visual qualities...[it shares] with a painting” – such as “the 
outside ornamentation” on his 1938 Bugatti Atlantic, “a rare and magnificently designed 
car” that’s been exhibited in several fine-art museums.9 Thus the experience of the 
automobile as art is not distinct from the experience of the car as a mode of transport. In 
other words, cars may trigger sentiments of beauty in any situation. The Atlantic’s visual 
countenance, made striking by the split windshield and the grille’s teardrop shape, is 
just as eye-catching from behind the wheel or the neighboring lane as it is behind velvet 
ropes. The same qualities – prestigious vintage, visible uniqueness – make the Atlantic 
beautiful “in every circumstance”; and these qualities are as beautiful in the Atlantic as 
they are in other “aesthetic circumstances” like paintings and sculptures. 
That said, we ourselves determine the characters of our aesthetic encounters 
with cars, as Roland Barthes does in an essay on the 1960 Citröen DS 19. Barthes 
juxtaposes notions of automotive beauty as the spirituality and grandiosity of art, with 
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impressions of cars as ordinary, familiar comforts. At first, he writes: “I think that cars 
today are almost the exact equivalent of the great Gothic cathedrals: I mean the 
supreme creation of an era, conceived with passion by unknown artists.”10 The DS, 
humorously called “Déesse,” goddess, is no exception; but later in the essay Barthes re-
envisions the car as “humanized...more objectlike...more homely,” a sublime “utensil.”11 
His flexible response to the DS demonstrates how one can willfully vary one’s aesthetic 
experience of cars: one may transform one’s own experience from that of fine art to that 
of quotidian utensils and back again.  
This adaptable perspective exemplifies Hume’s contention that our assessments 
of beauty are not merely passive reactions impressed upon us by external objects – 
rather we can, through applications of our reason, deliberately shape our aesthetic 
sentiments. To be sure, Hume writes, the decision that something is beautiful “depends 
on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole 
species...But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite 
to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment...”12 As Peter Kivy 
notes, for Hume the judgment of beauty is undeniably “epistemic”:13 it is determined by 
pre-existing knowledge and beliefs, and it “demands the assistance of our intellectual 
faculties.”14 We can and should choose how and when we consider cars beautiful, and 
make that choice in light of what we believe about cars’ uses and detriments. 
 
Humean Point 2. Utility is a determinant of beauty. 
In Hume’s estimation, “works of art are esteemed beautiful, in proportion to their 
fitness for the use of man.”15 Therefore a “machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a 
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house well contrived for use and conveniency, is so far beautiful, and is contemplated 
with pleasure and approbation.”16 A sentiment of beauty includes and depends upon a 
simultaneous impression of utility. Contemporary theorists maintain this proposition. 
Steven Davies proposes that useful objects are works of art when “they integrate their 
practical and aesthetic functions.”17 Allen Carlson and Glenn Parsons theorize 
“functional beauty” as a kind of beauty that emerges from an object’s ability to perform 
its proper function.18  
Similarly, among automotive journalists, what makes a car quick and fun to drive 
also makes it beautiful. Sexy designs, however great they look, make a car less 
pleasing if they hamper its handling and performance. Consider Frank Markus’ 
damaging review of the 2010 Chevrolet Camaro for Motor Trend: “While most of us still 
like the retro-riff design theme, we no longer love it enough to forgive the huge penalties 
it exacts on the packaging.”19 The Camaro’s design makes it too heavy to perform well 
against competing vehicles in its class. Its body shape “make[s] it difficult to sight 
through left-turn apexes...and the exaggerated and oversized steering-wheel rim and 
shifter make the driver feel small (aren’t these cars supposed to do the opposite?).”20  
Markus alludes to a key idiosyncrasy of automotive utility. Cars have multiple, 
sometimes conflicting functions. An automobile’s usefulness is contingent on its ability 
to transport passengers quickly, safely, and efficiently, as well as its ability to create an 
agreeable self-image for its driver who, in a Camaro, should be given to feel anything 
but “small.” A car’s visible beauty is useful to its driver when it helps to convey what she 
wants others to believe about her. This goes for car-inhabited nations and societies as 
well as individual manufacturers and drivers. Stephen Gundle notes that during the 
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twentieth century, the powerful image that America projected onto the world-screen was 
shaped and conveyed, deliberately and to a considerable extent, by the designs of 
American cars – machines like GM’s 1959 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, which “kick-started 
the imagination...express[ing] confidence, excitement, and even joy.”21  
Yet by pointing out that the Camaro fails at both its functions – being driveable 
and projecting an alluring image – Markus isn’t claiming that it’s ugly: he confesses to 
“lik[ing] the retro-riff design.” Thus although, for Hume and others, it seems intuitive to 
postulate a relationship between a thing’s beauty and its ability to perform its 
function(s), that relationship isn’t necessarily a positive correlation.22 The aesthetic 
appreciation of automobiles brings this issue to the forefront. 
 
Humean Point 3.  Beauty, utility, and morality are inseparable. 
Hume emphasizes social utility as fundamental to beauty: “everything, which 
contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation.”23 
In other words, since a sentiment of beauty includes an intimation of utility, it also 
includes morality: the impression that the object or action under consideration is 
beneficial to all mankind.24 This is because, according to Hume, “a concern for others” is 
a motivating “principle in our nature as humanity.”25  
Cars are indeed beneficial to contemporary human society. We rely on trucks to 
supply food and other necessities; and our economy would grind to a standstill without 
the presupposition that most people can get to work in a few minutes. From another 
perspective, though, the use and abuse of cars is less than constructive. Consider the 
vast numbers who die in road accidents, the massive contribution of exhaust fumes to 
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global warming, the wastefulness that results from the popular practice of trading in 
one’s car every three years. Although many of cars’ detrimental social effects result 
from their abuse by human drivers and marketers – reckless driving and premature 
trade-ins are human, not automotive, faults – the very existence of cars does affect our 
planet adversely. Is it just, even accurate, to call such things beautiful?  
To my ears, Irvin offers a resounding “No.” She probably has cars in mind when 
she writes: “This continually escalating pursuit of material things...leads to exhaustion of 
natural resources and harm to the environment, as we shelve or throw away goods that 
are still in working order and seek after ever bigger and shinier and faster symbols of 
status.”26 Instead, she argues, “what is needed is attention to the aesthetic elements 
already present in daily experience, to the rich and varied – and, if we attend carefully, 
complex and multisensory – satisfactions to be had in moments that do not involve 
Humvees or iPods or designer jeans,” or any other representative of excess, even 
though, especially in contemporary Western society, Humvees and so on are very much 
part of the daily experiences even of those who drive past them but don’t own them.27  
Hume agrees that because “luxury” was once “universally regarded as a vice,” it cannot 
incite sentiments of beauty.28 But while Hume might therefore claim that cars are ugly – 
albeit not necessarily, given his other tenets – Irvin implies that they should not be 
subject to aesthetic “attention” at all. 
However, consider this: music may be said to perpetuate similar eco-social ills. 
Kant and Plato claimed that music pollutes the air and moral sensibilities. The recording 
industry enables and encourages listeners to buy CDs and mp3s and discard them after 
a few months, once they’re no longer fashionable. And it’s public knowledge that the 
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American military uses music as a weapon of torture and warfare.29 Is music therefore 
unworthy of beauty, or of consideration by aestheticians? Or is moral worthiness an 
inappropriate criterion of aesthetic value? 
Both these options are unacceptable, even where cars are concerned. Rather 
than dismissing either cars’ aesthetic potential or morality’s influence on sentiments of 
beauty, we should perhaps consider the possibility that amorality and nonutility can 
coexist with beauty – admittedly in a tense relationship.  
Hume alights upon this tension when he writes of the poet Sannazarius. In 
Hume’s view, this poet “erred” by setting a poem at “the sea-shore, though he 
presented the most magnificent object in nature” – the ocean.30 The error arises 
because the ocean causes “toil, labor, and danger [to be] suffered by the fishermen”; 
and this is “painful” to readers, thanks to “an unavoidable sympathy” they feel with the 
fishermen.31 The fishermen’s pain theoretically precludes the poem and the ocean from 
engendering sentiments of beauty. Nevertheless, Hume can’t help observing that the 
ocean is aesthetically impressive: “magnificent” in fact. He makes no further remark on 
this evocative friction, which pervades Sannazarius’ poem and its subject: although the 
sea is dangerous, it is aesthetically appreciable, possessed of a sublime species of 
beauty. 
This strained relationship between beauty and benefit is at the heart of 
automobile aesthetics. Cars’ harmful eco-social effects conflict with their utility and 
beauty but, as I have shown, do not bar utility and beauty from our automotive 
experiences. Moreover, the aesthetic consideration of automobiles underscores this 
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provocative dissonance in Hume’s equation of beauty, utility, and morality. In my view, 
theoretical considerations of automobiles should overlook none of these aspects. 
 
To Conclude. 
Cars are contentious and unique aesthetic problems. Nonetheless, I’ve proposed 
that automobile aesthetics may take inspiration from, and provide critical perspectives 
on, three of Hume’s aesthetic tenets. In support of this proposal, I’ve attempted to 
demonstrate that, first: a car can be experienced as an elevated work of art and as a 
mundane tool; and we may alternate at will between these experiences. Second: to a 
significant extent, the beauty we may sense in cars or their characteristics sometimes, 
but not always, hinges on their usefulness to their owners and societies. Third: cars’ 
adverse eco-social effects influence but do not annul their aesthetic value, and must be 
taken into account as roots of a provocative friction between beauty and morality.  
The ambivalence in all these observations indicates that aesthetic considerations 
of automobiles are as ambiguous as they are controversial. In itself, this ambiguity – 
which Hume to some extent anticipates – makes aesthetic reflection on cars not just 
intriguingly difficult, but also necessary. Because automobile aesthetics, exhaustively 
considered, foregrounds vital issues that, at this moment, are pressingly at stake: not 
just the definitions of art and aesthetic experience; but also the condition of the (quote-
unquote) “developed” or “First” World, in which beauty, convenience, and comfort 
knowingly ride on the backs of social and ecological violence. 
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